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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of same-sex legalization and same-sex
relationship recognition on labor outcomes such as wages and specialization
for lesbian women. Using 1990 U.S. Census data and 2013 American Com-
munity Survey (ACS), I exploit the temporal and spatial variation of legal-
izing same-sex marriage using a triple difference-in-differences-in-differences
estimator, and employing an Oaxaca-Blinder wage and specialization de-
composition. Results demonstrate that unmarried lesbians who are primary
partners experience a wage premium of 15.2% and unmarried lesbians who
are secondary partners experience a more modest wage premium of 3.7%.
married lesbians who are secondary partners experience a wage penalty of
10.7%. For primary partners, wage premiums are 19.3% under domestic part-
nerships, and 15.9% under civil unions. No such effects are detected under
same-sex marriage for the general lesbian population, suggesting that the
primary partner marriage premium is being offset by the secondary partner
wage penalty. Marriage, more than any other legal institution, signals greater
commitment and in turn facilitates specialization. There is little evidence of
marriage market selection and employer discrimination related mechanisms.
Keywords: Gender, labor economics, same-sex marriage, marriage pre-
mium, specialization
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1 Introduction
The birth of the gay rights movement can be traced back to the Stonewall
riots in 1969, when the patrons of a gay bar in New York’s Greenwich Village
fought back against a police raid. Ten years later, 75,000 people participated
in the National March on Washington for Lesbian and Gay Rights in Wash-
ington, DC. This marks the first attempt by the LGBT community at forming
a political gathering. The public debate surrounding the gay rights movement
has increasingly received greater attention, particularly since the “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” policy under the Clinton administration. The LGBT movement
has many moving parts, but the heart of the public conversation about gay
rights has largely been propelled by the recognition of same-sex relationships
and the legalization of same-sex marriage. The first legal gay marriage in the
United States was performed between a lesbian couple in Cambridge, MA on
May 2004, between Tanya McCloskey and Marcia Kadish.
The subject of gay marriage is often framed within the language of human
and civil rights, as supporters of gay marriage argue that it is discriminatory
to extend the right to marry to some groups and not others. While this is a
stand-alone argument for gay marriage, what is often forgotten is that mar-
riage also confers economic benefits to those who subscribe to it. There has
been little thorough investigation of the extent to which marriage economic
benefits are translated to the same-sex context, if at all. This question is
worth studying because it would enhance our understanding of marriage as
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a gendered stratification and family formation process, and the effects that
legal institutions such as marriage or other forms of relationship recognition
have on the wage benefits that women of all sexual orientations are able to
extract from the market.
Marriage – for both heterosexual and homosexual couples – has both legal
and economic implications. The labor economics literature has hardly given
the issue of same-sex marriage as much attention as they have granted to het-
erosexual marriage. Recent studies show that over time, married individuals
experience net worth increases of 77% in comparison to single individuals
(Zagorsky, 2005). This renders the illegality of same-sex marriage in some
states as not solely a point of legal and religious discrimination, but also
one of economic discrimination. Economists have followed gay marriage’s
impact on local economies since Massachusetts became the first state to le-
galize same-sex marriage in 2004. Researchers at the Williams Institute have
found that from May 2004 to September 2008, Massachusetts’ economy has
seen an an inflow of $111 million attributable to gay marriage legalization
(Williams Institute, 2012). Furthermore, the Congressional Budget Office
have posited that the legalization of gay marriage has economic benefits that
could lead to an extra $1 billion each year for the next ten years (CBO, 2004).
This is largely driven by the stimulus that the marriage industry has on lo-
cal economies, particularly through weddings as they affect the restaurant,
hotel, catering, and travel industries. There is also an estimated fiscal im-
pact of $20-$40 million if same-sex marriages are legalized (Stevenson, 2012),
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primarily derived from sales and hotel occupancy tax revenues, and personal
income and estate taxes.
Beyond the question of immediate economic and fiscal impacts, the ques-
tion of labor outcomes also presents impending importance. The labor eco-
nomics literature has been preoccupied with understanding the patterns of
wages, employment, and income. Much of scholarly work has studied wage
gaps. Sufficiently investigated is the gender wage gap between men and
women. There are generally three proposed mechanisms for the existence of
the wage premium for married men. The first mechanism focuses on there
being a causal effect on productivity, focusing on household specialization as
a primary indicator of productivity (Becker, 1981; Greenhalgh, 1980). This
would mean that marriage causes men to become more productive in the
labor market and earn higher wages. This may arise from increased spe-
cialization of market and non-market time with one’s spouse. The second
mechanism invokes the notion of marriage market selection. This is a non-
random mechanism, as it suggests that men who are earning higher wages
may simply be more likely to be married. This is often attributable to un-
observed productivity, other unobservables correlated with productivity, or
wages themselves (Becker, 1973; Lafortune, 2013; Nakosteen, Westerlund and
Zimmer, 2004). Finally, the third mechanism offers an explanation for the
wage gap as induced by employer discrimination. This differential treatment
may arise from perceived differences in productivity or disparities in turnover
(Ahituv and Lerman, 2011; Becker, 1981).
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With that said, insufficiently investigated is the sexual orientation wage
gap between homosexuals and heterosexuals. The existing empirical liter-
ature documents the presence of a gap where gay men typically earn less
than heterosexual men (Badgett 1995; Klawitter and Flatt 1998; Clain and
Leppel 2001; Alegretto and Arthur 2001; Berg and Lien 2002; Black et al.
2003; Blandford 2003; Carpenter 2007). On the other hand, lesbian women
have been found to earn more than heterosexual women (Klawitter and Flatt
1998; Clain and Leppel 2001; Berg and Lien 2002; Black et al. 2003; Bland-
ford 2003). This is true even after controlling for differences in present labor
market supply, education, years of experience, area of residence, and occu-
pation (Schneebaum, 2013). In fact, the wages of never-married lesbians
are significantly higher than those of previously married lesbians and other
groups of women (Daneshvary, Waddoups, & Wimmer, 2009). For hetero-
sexual women, wages are typically negatively correlated with motherhood –
but are interestingly positively correlated to the wages of lesbians.
In this paper, I investigate the impact of legalizing same-sex marriage
on the labor outcomes of lesbian women. This paper gets at the heart of
what it is that legal status confers that cannot be achieved through private
contracts or cohabitation. I do so by exploiting the unique opportunity cre-
ated by this policy change to reexamine the determinants of the marriage
premium, utilizing the spatial and temporal variation in legalization to gain
new insight on the relationship between marriage and wages. I employ a
triple difference-in-differences-in-differences estimation and Oaxaca-Blinder
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decomposition. If the marriage penalty operates similarly for lesbian women
as it does for heterosexual women, I would the triple difference-in-differences
estimate to be negative. While this study is in the tradition of the literature
on the so-called marriage premium, it fills a lacuna in the research on the
earnings potential of lesbian women. The contributions of this study are
threefold: it considers lesbians, a group that has been relatively understud-
ied, uses most recent data from the U.S. Census and American Community
Survey (ACS), and econometrically distinguishes between the three suggested
potential mechanisms for the marriage premium or penalty.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
motivation. Section 3 offers the empirical motivation, describing the identi-
fication strategy, estimation strategy, and data sources. Section 4 presents
the main results. Section 5 concludes and provides future research direction.
2 Theoretical Motivation
2.1 Institutional Background on Same-Sex Marriage Le-
galization
The history of same-sex marriage in the US has been long and arduous.
The first confrontation between the people and legal system emerged in 1972
when the US Supreme Court dismissed the Baker vs. Nelson case. More
same-sex marriage appeals continued to be denied and dismissed until 1993,
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when the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that state laws which deny same-
sex couples the right to marry violated state constitutions. The path to
same-sex marriage legalization has been neither linear nor easy. With some
progress came some regress. In 1996, President Clinton signed the Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA). Despite that, in 1999, California became the first
state to recognize same-sex relationships, by introducing domestic partner-
ships. In 2000, Vermont was the first state to create civil unions. Finally
in 2004, Massachusetts was the first state to legalize same-sex marriage. As
of March 2015, same-sex couples are able to marry in 37 states, includ-
ing Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, Utah, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming, as well as the District of Columbia.
While marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships appear to be
similar at the surface level, each of the three institutions has important le-
gal distinctions. Domestic partnerships are the lowest level of relationship
recognition, providing a limited set of protections and responsibilities. Civil
unions provide slightly more protections and benefits than does a domestic
partnership, but they do not match up with the rights and responsibilities
immediately conferred by civil marriage. For example, civil unions do not
assure gay couples the right to collect benefits under a partner’s health in-
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surance program and to make medical decisions on behalf of a partner who is
unable to do so. The rights that come with marriage include family leave ben-
efits, state public assistance, property rights, emergency and non-emergency
medical rights, protection from spousal abuse, workers’ compensation, and
marital privileges in court proceedings (Burn, Jackson, 2014). Marriage cer-
tainly has certain legal functions that are not easily mimicked.
2.2 Marriage & The Wage Premium
Classical economic theory views wage differentials as being reflective of work-
ers’ human capital or productivity (Shi, 2006). The theory has generally had
a hard time reconciling itself with the realities of wage differentials in the US
data. Juhn et al. (1993) establishes that observable characteristics of work-
ers’ productivity, such as age, education, and experience explain only one
third of the differential between the ninetieth and tenth percale of the wage
distribution between 1963 and 1989. Standard economic theory attributes
this to discrimination on seemingly irrelevant factors such as race, gender,
and height. In response to the insufficiency of this proposition, the literature
has established three potential mechanisms through which wage gap could
emerge. This would apply to the sexual orientation wage gap too.
The first mechanism focuses on there being a causal effect on productivity,
focusing on household specialization as a primary indicator of productivity.
Becker’s canonical theory on marriage was first proposed in A Theory of Mar-
riage (1973). It presents the idea that household production requires both the
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use of non-market time and market goods. The theory is gender symmetric,
as it states that marriage makes spouses more productive in the sense that
men specialize in market work while women specialize in household produc-
tion. This is intimately related to the first mechanism through which a wage
gap could emerge. In the case of lesbians, one partner would have to be more
productive in the labor market and earn higher wages. This may arise from
increased specialization of market and non-market time with one’s spouse.
The second mechanism proposes marriage market selection. This is a non-
random mechanism, as it suggests that lesbians who are earning higher wages
may simply be more likely to be married. Put simply, this means that mar-
ried individuals tend to make more money because the traits that make an
individual earn a higher wage are also the traits that make a good marriage
partner. This is often attributed to unobserved productivity, other unob-
servables correlated with productivity, or wages themselves (Becker, 1973;
Lafortune, 2013; Nakosteen, Westerlund and Zimmer, 2004). This theory
has primarily been tested on heterosexual men, showing that even after mar-
riage fails, wages remain high, thereby explaining why divorced men make
more than men who have never married (Chiodo & Owyang, 2002). Finally,
the third mechanism offers an explanation for the wage gap as induced by
employer discrimination. Burn and Jackson (2014) establish that employer
discrimination is the primary cause of the premium for gay men in their
estimation sample. This differential treatment may arise from perceived dif-
ferences in productivity or disparities in turnover (Ahituv and Lerman, 2011;
15
Becker, 1981).
The literature has been largely mixed about which of these three mech-
anisms has the greatest explanatory power for the wage gap. Many studies
have established that heterosexual men benefit from a wage premium from
marriage that is often attributable to within-household specialization. Dif-
ferent studies report wage differentials between 10%-40% (Antonovics and
Town, 2004; Hill, 1979; Ginther and Zavodny, 2001; Nakosteen and Zimmer,
1987; Neumark, 1988; Schoeni, 1995). This phenomenon is explained by men
devoting more effort to being the bread winners, while their female part-
ners assume responsibility for household labor. Killewald and Gough (2013)
hypothesize that if specialization causes the male marriage premium, then
married women should subsequently experience wage losses. Their results
do not support the specialization hypothesis, as they find that both childless
men and women receive a marriage premium; a result that is also corrobo-
rated by Anderson, Binder, and Krause (2003). The returns to marriage in
a Beckerian sense rest on the returns to specialization; a phenomenon that
same-sex couples do not seem too quick to buy into (Jepsen & Jepsen, 2002).
Perhaps specialization is more common in opposite-sex couples because only
one of the partners, the woman, can bear children.
Scholarly work on the consequences of entry into a legally sanctioned
same-sex marriage or union on the so-called partnership premium is limited.
There are few studies that examine the actual or potential labor market im-
pacts of same-sex marriage or other forms of same-sex recognition. Aldén,
16
Edlund, Hammarstedt and Mueller-Smith (2013), find that opting into a reg-
istered partnership in Sweden, leads to a decline in the joint earnings of gay
male couples as well as a convergence in their earnings, suggesting the lack of
a partnership premium. They find that registered partnerships are important
to both gay men and lesbian women but for different reasons. For gay men,
resource pooling appears to be the main function of registered partnership,
while for lesbians, it is seen as a vehicle for family formation. Interestingly,
they also find that there is no evidence of specialization among lesbians,
while specialization is most pronounced among heterosexual couples. This
begs even more questions, particularly in the context of studies that point to
long-term commitment not necessarily translating to the same-sex context
(Andersson, Noack, Seierstad, & Weedon-Fekjr, 2006). These results paint a
picture of same-sex unions playing a different role for same-sex couples than
marriage does for heterosexual couples.
Studies have found a significant earning advantage for lesbians, relative
to heterosexual women in the US (Antecol, Jong & Steinberger 2008; Berg
& Lien 2002; Baumle 2009; Black, Makar, Klawitter 2003; Blandford 2003).
Daneshvary, Waddoups, and Wimmer (2008) find that a lesbian premium
is approximately 10% for women without a bachelor’s degree, but this gap
closes in the case of women with higher levels of education. Schneebaum
(2013) finds that motherhood is typically negatively correlated with wages
for straight women, and interestingly, positively correlated with wages for
lesbians as a whole. With that said, a closer decomposition shows that this
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signal is only positive for primary lesbian partners, and negative for secondary
partners.
Research that investigates the impact of sexual preferences on labor out-
comes is not limited to the US. Conclusions are mixed. Studies show that in
the Netherlands, “young and highly educated gay male workers earn about 3%
less than heterosexual men,” while “similarly qualified lesbian workers earn
about 3% more than their heterosexual female co-workers” (Plug, Berkhout,
2004). On the other hand, research suggests that there is a negative effect
(6.1%) of lesbian sexual orientation on wages in the Greek labor market.
The impact of sexual orientation anti-discrimination policies on the wages of
lesbians and gay men has been found to be positive for both men and women
in same-sex couples. Both men and women experience a wage premium of
0.3% for each year the policy has been in effect (Gates, 2009).
3 Empirical Motivation
3.1 Identification Strategy
The identification strategy is based on exploiting temporal and spatial varia-
tion in the legalization of same-sex marriage in the US. The fact that different
states enact different forms of same-sex relationship recognition, ranging from
domestic partnerships, civil unions, to marriages, at different times, makes
for an appropriate natural experiment. I identify lesbian women from the
sample using information on the gender of the household head, gender, and
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the relationships of others in the household to the head. I consider women
to be lesbians if the relationship to their spouse is that of an “unmarried
partner” who is also female. One drawback of this strategy is that I am only
able to identify partnered lesbian women (married and unmarried), as I am
unable to identify single lesbians from the dataset. For the aforementioned
reason, I drop all single women from the estimation sample as their sexual
orientation cannot be identified. Furthermore, the estimation strategy relies
on the availability of same-sex marriage rather than on the unobserved actual
marital status of lesbians in the data.
From both the 1990 Census and 2013 ACS, I collect data on annual salary
earnings, usual hours worked per week, weeks worked per year, in addition
to analogous data on the respondent’s spouse. Wage data is adjusted for
inflation usng the Current Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers
(CPI-U) series from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I also collect data on co-
habitation, occupation, and demographics that include schooling, experience,
age, ethnicity, English proficiency, number of children. I also include region
and state variables, state-level female labor force participation rates by sex-
ual orientation, and state-level female population shares of lesbian women.
In addition to these variables, I also obtain data on same-sex recognition,
specifically on marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships from the
National Conference of State Legislatures (2013). I use data on the type
of relationship recognition and and the year it was enacted, in addition to
whether the state possesses an Employment Non-Discrimination Act using
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data from the Human Rights Campaign (2013).
3.2 Estimation Strategy
I estimate two primary difference-in-differences-in-difference specifications:
LnWagei =  0 +  1Gay +  2Post+  3SSM +  4Gay·Post+  5Gay·SSM +
 6SSM ·Post+  7Gay·Post·SSM +  8X + "i
where LnWage is the logged wage of women i, Specialization is the absolute
difference between the number of hours worked between primary and secondary
partners, Gay is a binary indiactor for being homosexual, Post is a binary indicator
for year 2013, SSM is a binary indicator for whether SSM is legal in a state, and
X is a vector of control variables that include demographic, occupation, and region
controls.
Specializationi =  0 +  1Gay +  2Post+  3SSM +  4Gay·Post+  5Gay·SSM +
 6SSM ·Post+  7Gay·Post·SSM +  8X + "i
where Specialization is the absolute difference between the number of hours
worked between primary and secondary partners women i, Gay is a binary indiactor
for being homosexual, Post is a binary indicator for year 2013, SSM is a binary
indicator for whether SSM is legal in a state, and X is a vector of control variables
that include demographic, occupation, and region controls.
The coefficient of interest is  7, which capturs the extent to which a
location-based mean wage differential between same-sex marriage states and
non-same-sex marriage states change over the time window considered, from
20
1990 to 2013, differentially for lesbian women and heterosexual women. This
effect is also known as the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect in the econometrics
literature (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996). The triple difference coeffi-
cient offers a more refined estimate than double difference coefficient would
theoretically would have. Further, the coefficient can be interpreted as the
conditional mean for the U.S. population as the equations are estimated us-
ing weighted least squares (WLS) rather than ordinary least squares (OLS)
(Solon, Haider, and Woolridge, 2013).
In addition to the regression results, I also obtain an estimate of the 1990
and 2013 premium by performing an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Blin-
der and Oaxaca, 1973). This decomposition gives the log wage differences
between lesbians and heterosexual women. Formally, the group-specific equa-
tions for log wages and specialization are given below, where L and H indicate
lesbian women and heterosexual women, respectively:
LnWageiL = X iiL L + "iL
LnWageiH = X iiH H + "iH
where LnWage is the logged wage as defined previously, X is the vector of
covariates but now with a group-specific intercept term. The mean difference
in log wages between lesbian women and heterosexual women is decomposed
as follows:
LnWageL   LnWageH = (XL  XH)
0
 H +X
0
L( L    H)
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I also perform the decomposition for the specialization differences between
lesbians and heterosexual women. The related equations are as follows:
SpeciL = X iiL L + "iL
SpeciH = X iiH H + "iH
where Spec is specialization as defined previously, X is the vector of covari-
ates but now with a group-specific intercept term. The mean difference in
log wages between lesbian women and heterosexual women is decomposed as
follows:
SpecL   SpecH = (XL  XH)
0
 H +X
0
L( L    H)
Both sets of equations for logged wage and specialization are estimated
using weighted least squares (WLS) with standard errors clustered at the
state-level.
3.3 Data Sources
I use the 1990 Decennial U.S. Census data as that marks the last census
that predates legal recognition of same-sex relationships. I also use the 2013
American Community Service (ACS) data as it is the most recent data set.
This is the first paper in the literature to cover that large a stretch of time, in
addition to offering the largest samples of states with recognition and widest
range of ages for the institutions. The sheer size of the data is also favorable
as the lesbian population is extremely small.
22
With that said, there are some drawbacks worthy of mentioning. One
drawback to using Census and ACS data is that it does not include any
data about sexual behavior. In addition, measurement error with regards
to the lesbian population is possible. In 1990, the Census Bureau recoded
the sex of the respondent’s partners assuming that all married couples of the
same gender were heterosexual couples. Any respondents who had mentioned
that their partner was of the same sex were recoded to match that of a
heterosexual couple (Allegretto and Arthur, 2001). The Census Bureau only
stopped recoding from 2000 onwards. The result was that as many as 20-40%
of same-sex couples were actually being undetected in the data (Gates and
Steinberger, 2009). There may be some reason for concern in using the 1990
data Census, but the estimation strategy employed takes care of any bias
that may arise.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Discussion
I begin by examining average wages in the data set by group and year. Figure
1 presents mean wages by group and year, showing that lesbians experienced
the largest increase. This is further corroborated by Figure 2, which illus-
trates that unmarried heterosexuals underwent negative mean wage growth
between 1990 and 2013, while lesbians experienced the greatest growth. Fig-
ure 3, 4, 5, and 6 present log wage kernel density distributions across different
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groups of women and years. The distributions appear to be largely normal,
although not some groups, like married heterosexual and unmarried hetero-
sexual women present unsmoothed log wage distribtuions. Figure 3 shows
that the increase in average wages for lesbian women was primarily driven
by an increase of wages in the middle part of the wage distribution.
Table 1 presents all the variables considered in the analysis and their def-
initions. Table 2 presents the history of same-sex relationship recognition,
demonstrating the institutions to which different states have subscribed to.
Table 3 present descriptive statistics for the year 1990 and 2013 respectively.
The average wages of lesbian and married heterosexual women increase over
the 23 year time period, while the average wage for unmarried heterosex-
ual women decreases. Schooling and number of years of experience increase
across the three groups.
Table 4 presents the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of wage and special-
ization differentials across 1990 and 2013. The decomposition reports the
mean prediction by groups and their differences. “Endowments” reflect the
mean increase in lesbians’ wages if they had the same characteristics of het-
erosexual women. “Coefficients” quantifies the changes in lesbians’ wages
when applying the coefficients of heterosexual women to lesbian women’s
characteristics. “Interaction” measures the simultaneous effect of differences
in endowments and coefficients. In 1990, the mean of log wages is 2.447 for
heterosexual women and 2.588 for lesbians, yielding a wage gap of -0.141.
At this point in time, lesbian women would actually be at a disadvantage
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if they were more similar to heterosexual women. This gross difference re-
verses, but insignificantly, in 2013. I also assess the specialization gap, and
find that lesbian women are specializing less in comparison to heterosexual
women across both years. In both years, this is largely attributable to the
different endowments that both groups have. With that said, lesbian women
experience a greater growth of specialization from 1990 to 2013 when com-
pared to heterosexual women. This speaks to a broader story that emerges
from the data, about the effects of the newfound ability to partner - either
through domestic partnerships, civil unions, or marriages - on commital and
the division of labor in a same-sex household.
Table 5 presents the static specifications, establishing a statistically in-
significant 4.7% penalty for married lesbians, and a similarly statistically
insignificant 6.2% premium for unmarried lesbians and 2.3% premium for
all the women in the data set using weighted least squares regression. These
results represent baseline estimates of the relationship between same-sex mar-
riage legalization and the wages of lesbian women. I investigate these effects
further, as the static results may mask significant underlying dynamics in the
legalization-wage relationship. Table 6 presents the dynamic specifications,
establishing statistically insignificant relationships between wage and the le-
galization of same-sex marriage across various time windows of consideration.
This reinforces the outcomes of Table 4.
I turn to the analysis of the impact of same-sex relationship recognition
on wages. Table 7 presents the legalization-wage estimates separated by
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the number of years since same-sex relationship recognition, including insti-
tutions such as civil unions and domestic partnerships. I provide baseline
estimates, as well as those split across 4 years, 6 years, 8 years, 10 years, and
13 years. The estimates are consistently positive across all stratifications
considered, but only achieve significance after the time since recognition has
been at least 13 years. The wage premium observed after at least 13 years
of recognition is 7.9%. At the base-line level, the wage premium is 7%.
In Table 8, I explore this effect across different stratifications of state
“take-up,” that is, the percentage of same-sex couples in the same-sex mar-
riage state who indicate on census forms that they classify their relationship
as that of a “married couple.” While the estimates appear to be positive and
statistically significant, the relationship between take-up and the premium
is certainly not linear. It decreases as take-up levels increases. The highest
wage premium estimated is at 21.2% in states with at least 30% take-up, and
lowest in states with at least 60% take-up. This nonlinear pattern may be
related to the underlying mechanisms driving the marriage premium.
I delve into a deeper composition of same-sex relationship recognition, by
stratifying the data across civil unions and domestic partnerships in Table
9. The results point to a statistically significant 12.9% marriage premium
associated with the availability of domestic partnerships, and an insignificant
6.4% penalty associated with the availability of civil unions - an institution
that is arguably the most similar to marriage with regards to the legal pro-
tections it confers. There appears to be a link between the legal status of
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recognition and the wage premium or penalty observed. The least legally
protective institution - domestic partnership - confers the highest premium,
while the most legally protective institution - marriage - imposes the largest
penalty. These results point to a mechanism that is not immediately and
obviously accounted for in the mechanisms considered in this study.
I extend my investigation by going beyong the use of wages as the depen-
dent variable, by also considering specialization, as defined by the absolute
difference in the number of hours worked between the primary and secondary
partner. This would address the causal productivity hypothesis considered.
Table 10 offers estimates the impact of the availability of same-sex marriage
on the specialization of lesbian women separated across different time win-
dows since same-sex marriage legalization. The estimates point to a highly
significant, positive, nonlinear relationship, with baseline estimates suggest-
ing a 150% increase in specialization attributable to the newfound opportu-
nity to marry. The results presented in Table 11 control for non-cohabitation
as a robustness check for the results observed in Table 10. My intuition is
confirmed, and the effects appear to be even stronger when solely looking at
cohabiting couples.
In Table 12, I test the impact of specialization on wages, and find that
estimates indicate a marriage premium, but it fails to achieve statistial sig-
nificance. This mitigates concerns about endogenous legalization; meaning
that changes in the productivity of lesbians are not causally linked to states
legalizing same-sex marriage. The other takeaway from this table is that
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although lesbian women are specializing more, they are failing to realize the
economic benefits of marriage that heterosexual men are typically able to ex-
tract, as induced by causal productivity. This could be interpreted as lesbian
women specializing more - meaning that the wages of primary partners are
rising, while the wages of secondary partners are falling - leading to an effect
that is generally offset by the two counteracting mechanisms for the group
of lesbian women as a whole. I test this hypothesis by stratifying across
partnership status, differentiating between primary and secondary partners.
I define a primary partner as the woman that works more hours per week
in comparison to her other partner. I explore this effect in greater depth in
Section 5.2.
Finally, I eliminate the potential that the legalization-wage relationship is
driven by the marriage market selection and employer non-discrimination act
hypotheses. These results are presented in Table 13 and 14, illustrating that
none of the estimates are significant under the time intervals considered.
Eliminating marriage market selection as a non-random mechanism gives
some confidence that the triple difference coefficient is not correlated with
the error term, ".
4.2 Heterogeneity of Impacts
Table 15 offers a decomposition of the static specification across primary and
secondary partners, demonstrating that primary and secondary unmarried
lesbian partners extract a positive and statistically significant wage premium.
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Primary partners realize a 15.2% premium, while secondary partners realize
a 3.7% premium. Interestingly, this effect reverses for married lesbians who
are secondary partners. They experience a 10.7% penalty, attributable to the
newfound availability of same-sex marriage. Married lesbians who are pri-
mary partners experience a slight premium but it is statistically insignificant.
This reveals interesting insights that disentangle being a secondary partner
in a relationship from being a secondary partner in a marriage. The results
suggest that marriage affects secondary partners more adversely, as they are
the partners who specialize in non-market work. My intuition is corroborated
in the next few tables which explore and decompose the impacts of same-sex
marriage legalization and relationship recognition.
Table 16 presents dynamic same-sex relationship recognition specifica-
tions across primary and secondary partners over various time windows. The
results demonstrate that primary partners have a 15.9% wage premium at
baseline, while secondary partners do not extract any premiums of signif-
icance. Table 17 presents the results of recognition decomposed into the
specific effects of civil unions and domestic partnerships across primary and
secondary partners. Primary partners benefit from both civil unions and do-
mestic partnerships, at extracting 15.9% and 19.3% wage premiums respec-
tively. Interestingly, secondary partners also come out with a wage premium
of 10.5% under domestic partnerships but this quickly dissipates under civil
unions. These results are in line with Table 9, as the results point to the
overarching benefit of domestic partnerships, but the differential impact that
29
the enactment of civil unions has depending on the partnership status of the
woman in the relationship.
Table 18 presents the impact of same-sex marriage legalization after con-
trolling for covariates on children across primary and secondary partners.
The estimates yield interesting results. Primary partners have a 489.8% wage
premium for the first two years since legalization, but this effect quickly dis-
sipates after some time decay. For secondary partners though, the effect is
more sticky, as it is consistently negative and significant. The effect atten-
uates with the passage of time since legalization. Secondary partners have
a 259.7% wage penalty for the first two years after enactment, settling at
penalty of 155.5% ten years after legalization.
5 Conclusions & Implications
This study illustrates that lesbians in general do not extract marriage premi-
ums. This is potentially driven by heterogeneous behavior within the lesbian
group of women as a whole. Across a variety of specifications, primary part-
ners appear to be earning a statistically significant wage premium, while
secondary partners are experiencing a similarly significant wage penalty. As
some lesbian women specialise more, the wages of primary partners who spe-
cialize in market work are rising, while the wages of secondary partners who
specialize in non-market work are falling, resuling in the net effect of same-
sex marriage legalization being zero for lesbian women. The primary partner
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marriage premium is offset by the secondary partner marriage penalty. Mar-
riage, more than any other institutions like civil unions or domestic partner-
ships, signals greater commitment and thus facilitates specialization. Legal
and institutional acknowledgement of ongoing commitment potentially trans-
lates into broader social acceptance and non-monetary but equally valuable
returns.
For unmarried lesbians who are primary partners, I estimate a wage pre-
mium of 15.2% and for unmarried lesbians who are secondary partners, I
estimate a more modest marriage premium of 3.7%. Married lesbians who
are secondary partners experience a wage penalty of 10.7%. Furthermore,
the dynamic nature of marriage as a legal institution is revealed through the
analysis which demonstrates that for lesbians as a whole, the premium from
same-sex relationship recognition kicks in 13 years after enactment. These
dynamics are partially attributable to state-level heterogeneity as defined by
state take-up rates. This premium when stratified across partnership status
reveals that the effect is strongest at baseline; that is, past 13 years after en-
actment - but only for primary partners. When decomposed specifically into
civil unions and domestic partnerships, primary partners once again have a
wage premium of 19.3% that is highest under domestic partnerships. This
effect is attenuated under civil unions at a premium of 15.9%. The premium
persists for secondary partners at 10.5% but only under domestic partner-
ships. These results point to the importance of specialization in determining
market-work and wages. An investigation of the impact of legalizing same-
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sex marriage suggests that there is a 150% causal increase in specialization
at baseline for lesbians in general. The effect is even stronger after drop-
ping non-cohabitating couples. The effects of marriage market selection and
employer discrimination have limited contributions in this setting.
This paper takes on a reduced form approach, producing empirical results
about the impact of the availability of same-sex legalization on wages and
specialization for lesbian women. To make progress about the mechanisms
driving the results we observe, there is a need to develop structural theory
that theorizes and accounts for the role that legal institutions play in shap-
ing individuals’ decisions. A starting point would be to open up the family
and gender conomics field to thinking about sexual orientation as a distri-
bution factor in the intra-household resource allocation literature, and using
cooperative and non-cooperatives games to model cohabitation and marriage
decisions.
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Figure 1: Mean Wages by Group and Year
Sources: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
Calculations are weighted by corresponding individual sample weights.
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Figure 2: Mean Wage Growth By Group and Legal State, 1990 to 2013
Sources: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
Calculations are weighted by corresponding individual sample weights.
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Figure 3: Wage Distributions of Lesbian Women by Year
Sources: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
Distributions are kernel density plots weighted by corresponding individual sample
weights.
Figure 4: Wage Distributions of Married Heterosexual Women by Year
Sources: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
Distributions are kernel density plots weighted by corresponding individual sample
weights.
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Figure 5: Wage Distributions of Unmarried Heterosexual Women by Year
Sources: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
Distributions are kernel density plots weighted by corresponding individual sample
weights.
Figure 6: Wage Distributions of Lesbians by Partnership Status & Year
Sources: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
Distributions are kernel density plots weighted by corresponding individual sample
weights.
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Table 1: List of Variables
Variable Definition
Dependent Variables
Natural logarithm of hourly earnings
Specialization
Independent Variables
Sexual Orientation (=1 if Lesbian, =0 if heterosexual)
Marital Status (=1 if married, =0 if otherwise)
Demographics
Experience, Experience Squared, Black, Hispanic, Non-Native English Speaker,
Children, Children under the age of 5, Usual Hours Worked Per Week
Education (=1 if True, = 0 if False)
Schooling, Schooling Squared, High School, Associate’s Degree, Bachelor’s Degree,
Master’s Degree, PhD degree, Professional Degree
Occupation (=1 if True, = 0 if False)
Service, Manager, Professional, Health Care Professional, Teacher, Technical Profession,
Sales, Administrative, Finance, Agriculture, Craft/Repair, Laborer, Transportation, Military
Location (=1 if True, = 0 if False)
Urban
Region (=1 if True, = 0 if False)
New England, Mid-Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic,
East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific
Main Difference-in-Differences-in-Differences Variables (= 1 if True, = 0 if False)
Same-Sex Marriage Legalized in State
Civil Unions Recognised in State
Domestic Partnership Recognised in State
SSM, CCU, or DP Recognised in State
2013 ACS Respondent
Other Important Variables
Time Since SSR Recognition
Take-Up
Employer Non-Discrimination Act Protections Enacted
Proportion of Lesbians in State
Labor Force Participation Rate of Lesbians in State
Labor Force Participation Rate of Heterosexual Female in State
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Table 2: History of Same-Sex Relationship Recognition
State Year Take-Up (%)
Domestic Partnership CA 1999 37.3
RI 2002 33.1
ME 2004 34.7
WA 2007 36.8
MD 2008 48.2
OR 2008 20.9
CO 2009 24.1
NV 2009 30.7
WI 2009 32.2
Civil Union NJ 2007 32.5
IL 2011 40.9
Same-Sex Marriage MA 2004 59.0
CT 2008 53.4
VT 2009 49.0
IA 2009 52.7
DC 2010 28.5
NH 2010 57.5
NY 2011 45.5
DE 2013 31.9
HI 2013 21.4
MN 2013 33.4
NM 2013 22.4
Note: Take-up data is from the Census Bureau. It refers to the percentage of same-sex
couples in each state who indicate on their census forms that they classify their
relationship as a married couple.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by Year
Year 1990 2013
Lesbian Married Heterosexual Unmarried Heterosexual Lesbian Married Heterosexual Unmarried Heterosexual
Wage 15.912 14.301 13.177 17.520 16.967 12.935
(13.478) (25.973) (24.408) (28.885) (27.317) (22.311)
Schooling 15.414 14.158 13.937 15.512 15.136 14.492
(2.782) (2.683) (2.663) (2.679) (2.943) (2.666)
Experience 13.565 20.656 16.086 20.473 25.169 18.356
(9.657) (11.726) (14.401) (12.143) (12.350) (15.177)
HSG 0.163 0.337 0.288 0.181 0.218 0.237
(0.369) (0.473) (0.453) (0.385) (0.413) (0.425)
Black 0.084 0.078 0.164 0.091 0.081 0.180
(0.277) (0.268) (0.370) (0.288) (0.273) (0.384)
Hispanic 0.077 0.063 0.073 0.129 0.126 0.158
(0.266) (0.244) (0.260) (0.335) (0.331) (0.365)
Speaks English 0.010 0.021 0.019 0.008 0.040 0.031
(0.097) (0.143) (0.135) (0.088) (0.195) (0.173)
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Table 4: Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Estimates
LnWage Specialization
1990 2013 1990 2013
Heterosexual 2.447*** 2.561*** 12.331*** 13.803***
Lesbian 2.588*** 2.556*** 10.080*** 12.286***
Gross Difference -0.141*** 0.004 2.251*** 1.518***
Decomposition
Endowments -0.043* 0.024 1.156** 0.957***
Coefficients -0.017 -0.002 1.129*** 0.823**
Interaction -0.080*** -0.017 -0.033 -0.263
Note: “Endowments” reflect the mean increase in lesbians’ wages if they had the
same characteristics of heterosexual women. “Coefficients” quantifies the changes in
lesbians’ wages when applying the coefficients of heterosexual women to lesbian
women’s characteristics. “Interaction” measures the simultaneous effect of
differences in endowments and coefficients.
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Table 5: Static Same-Sex Marriage Wage-Legalization Specifications
Dependent V ariable : Log Wage
Married Lesbians Unmarried Lesbians All
Lesbian·Married·Post  0.047 0.062 0.023
(0.049) (0.042) (0.040)
Controls
Demographic X X X
Occupation X X X
Region X X X
N 1, 644, 156 1, 272, 632 2, 912, 949
R2 0.287 0.332 0.322
Notes: Unit of observation is at the individual-level. Weights in the estimation are
individual sample weights. Regressions include demographic, occupation, and region
controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and presented in parentheses.
Demographic controls include schooling, schooling squared, experience, experience squared,
dummy variables for having a high school degree, an A.A. degree, a B.A. degree, a M.A.
degree, a Ph.D. degree, being Black, being Hispanic, and achieving English proficiency.
Occupation controls are dummy variables for major occupation categories. Region controls
are dummy variables for the U.S. Census divisions and urban residents. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤⇤⇤. N is the number of
observations. Source: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
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Table 6: Dynamic Same-Sex Marriage Wage-Legalization Specifications
Dependent V ariable : Log Wage
TSR  2 TSR  3 TSR  5 TSR  6 TSR  8
Lesbian·SSM · Post 0.028 0.039 0.031 0.026 0.026
(0.063) (0.054) (0.053) (0.042) (0.042)
Controls
Demographic X X X X X
Occupation X X X X X
Region X X X X X
N 2, 765, 730 2, 806, 909 2, 820, 034 2, 896, 968 2, 896, 968
R2 0.310 0.314 0.314 0.320 0.320
Notes: Unit of observation is at the individual-level. Weights in the estimation are
individual sample weights. Regressions include demographic, occupation, and region
controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and presented in parentheses.
Demographic controls include schooling, schooling squared, experience, experience squared,
dummy variables for having a high school degree, an A.A. degree, a B.A. degree, a M.A.
degree, a Ph.D. degree, being Black, being Hispanic, and achieving English proficiency.
Occupation controls are dummy variables for major occupation categories. Region controls
are dummy variables for the U.S. Census divisions and urban residents. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤⇤⇤. N is the number of
observations. Source: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
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Table 7: Dynamic Same-Sex Relationship Wage-Recognition Specifications
Dependent V ariable : Log Wage
Baseline TSR  4 TSR  6 TSR  8 TSR  10 TSR  13
Lesbian·Rec · Post 0.070⇤ 0.035 0.056 0.068 0.074 0.079⇤
(0.038) (0.059) (0.052) (0.051) (0.046) (0.045)
Controls
Demographic X X X X X X
Occupation X X X X X X
Region X X X X X X
N 2, 912, 949 2, 715, 589 2, 784, 144 2, 797, 862 2, 835, 607 2, 838, 071
R2 0.322 0.308 0.312 0.312 0.316 0.317
Notes: Unit of observation is at the individual-level. Weights in the estimation are
individual sample weights. Regressions include demographic, occupation, and region
controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and presented in parentheses.
Demographic controls include schooling, schooling squared, experience, experience squared,
dummy variables for having a high school degree, an A.A. degree, a B.A. degree, a M.A.
degree, a Ph.D. degree, being Black, being Hispanic, and achieving English proficiency.
Occupation controls are dummy variables for major occupation categories. Region controls
are dummy variables for the U.S. Census divisions and urban residents. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤⇤⇤. N is the number of
observations. Source: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
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Table 8: Same-Sex Marriage Wage-Legalization Specifications by State-Level
Take-Up Rates
Dependent V ariable : Log Wage
Take   up  0.3 Take   up  0.4 Take   up  0.5 Take   up  0.6
Lesbian·Rec·Post 0.212⇤ 0.120 ⇤ ⇤⇤ 0.074⇤ 0.070⇤
(0.076) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
Controls
Demographic X X X X
Occupation X X X X
Region X X X X
N 1, 672, 459 2, 321, 428 2, 742, 873 2, 912, 949
R2 0.305 0.317 0.320 0.322
Notes: Unit of observation is at the individual-level. Weights in the estimation are
individual sample weights. Regressions include demographic, occupation, and region
controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and presented in parentheses.
Demographic controls include schooling, schooling squared, experience, experience squared,
dummy variables for having a high school degree, an A.A. degree, a B.A. degree, a M.A.
degree, a Ph.D. degree, being Black, being Hispanic, and achieving English proficiency.
Occupation controls are dummy variables for major occupation categories. Region controls
are dummy variables for the U.S. Census divisions and urban residents. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤⇤⇤. N is the number of
observations. Source: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
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Table 9: Same-Sex Relationship Wage-Recognition Decomposition Specifica-
tions
Dependent V ariable : Log Wage
Civil Unions Domestic Partnerships
Lesbian·Rec·Post  0.064 0.129 ⇤ ⇤⇤
(0.102) (0.042)
Controls
Demographic X X
Occupation X X
Region X X
N 2, 912, 949 2, 912, 949
R2 0.320 0.320
Notes: Unit of observation is at the individual-level. Weights in the estimation are
individual sample weights. Regressions include demographic, occupation, and region
controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and presented in parentheses.
Demographic controls include schooling, schooling squared, experience, experience squared,
dummy variables for having a high school degree, an A.A. degree, a B.A. degree, a M.A.
degree, a Ph.D. degree, being Black, being Hispanic, and achieving English proficiency.
Occupation controls are dummy variables for major occupation categories. Region controls
are dummy variables for the U.S. Census divisions and urban residents. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤⇤⇤. N is the number of
observations. Source: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
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Table 10: Dynamic Same-Sex Marriage Specialization-Legalization Specifi-
cations
Dependent V ariable : Specialization
Baseline TSS  2 TSS  4 TSS  6 TSS  8 TSS  10
Lesbian·SSM ·Post 1.500⇤ 2.293 ⇤ ⇤ 1.932⇤ 1.439⇤ 1.439⇤ 1.500⇤
(0.766) (1.074) (1.033) (0.766) (0.766) (0.766)
Controls
Demographic X X X X X X
Occupation X X X X X X
Region X X X X X X
N 1, 667, 421 1, 591, 746 1, 614, 809 1, 659, 090 1, 659, 090 1, 667, 421
R2 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
Notes: Unit of observation is at the individual-level. Weights in the estimation are
individual sample weights. Regressions include demographic, occupation, and region
controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and presented in parentheses.
Demographic controls include schooling, schooling squared, experience, experience squared,
dummy variables for having a high school degree, an A.A. degree, a B.A. degree, a M.A.
degree, a Ph.D. degree, being Black, being Hispanic, and achieving English proficiency.
Occupation controls are dummy variables for major occupation categories. Region controls
are dummy variables for the U.S. Census divisions and urban residents. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤⇤⇤. N is the number of
observations. Source: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
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Table 11: Dynamic Same-Sex Marriage Specialization-Legalization Specifi-
cations (2)
Controlling for Non  Cohabitating Couples
Dependent V ariable : Specialization
TSS  2 TSS  4 TSS  6 TSS  8 TSS  10
Lesbian·SSM ·Post 2.810⇤ 2.034 1.780⇤ 1.780⇤ 1.780⇤
(1.492) (1.413) (1.024) (1.024) (1.024)
Controls
Demographic X X X X X
Occupation X X X X X
Region X X X X X
N 1, 561, 931 1, 584, 278 1, 626, 806 1, 626, 806 1, 626, 806
R2 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
Notes: Unit of observation is at the individual-level. Weights in the estimation are
individual sample weights. Regressions include demographic, occupation, and region
controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and presented in parentheses.
Demographic controls include schooling, schooling squared, experience, experience squared,
dummy variables for having a high school degree, an A.A. degree, a B.A. degree, a M.A.
degree, a Ph.D. degree, being Black, being Hispanic, and achieving English proficiency.
Occupation controls are dummy variables for major occupation categories. Region controls
are dummy variables for the U.S. Census divisions and urban residents. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤⇤⇤. N is the number of
observations. Source: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
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Table 12: Dynamic Same-Sex Marriage Wage-Specialization Specifications
Dependent V ariable : Log Wage
TSS  2 TSS  4 TSS  6
Lesbian·SSM ·Post 0.032 0.037 0.020
(0.059) (0.050) (0.039)
Controls
Demographic X X X
Occupation X X X
Region X X X
N 1, 591, 746 1, 614, 809 1, 659, 090
R2 0.276 0.281 0.290
Notes: Unit of observation is at the individual-level. Weights in the estimation are
individual sample weights. Regressions include demographic, occupation, and region
controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and presented in parentheses.
Demographic controls include schooling, schooling squared, experience, experience squared,
dummy variables for having a high school degree, an A.A. degree, a B.A. degree, a M.A.
degree, a Ph.D. degree, being Black, being Hispanic, and achieving English proficiency.
Occupation controls are dummy variables for major occupation categories. Region controls
are dummy variables for the U.S. Census divisions and urban residents. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤⇤⇤. N is the number of
observations. Source: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
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Table 13: Dynamic Same-Sex Marriage Wage-Legalization Specifications -
Marriage Market Selection Hypothesis
Dependent V ariable : Log Wage
Control Proportion of Lesbians in Population Lesbian & Hetero LFP in Population
TSR  2 TSR  4 TSR  6 TSR  2 TSR  4 TSR  6
Lesbian·SSM·Post 0.028 0.028 0.025 0.029 0.030 0.027
(0.063) (0.052) (0.042) (0.064) (0.053) (0.042)
Controls
Demographic X X X X X X
Occupation X X X X X X
Region X X X X X X
N 2, 765, 730 2, 820, 034 2, 896, 968 2, 760, 023 2, 814, 327 2, 891, 261
R2 0.310 0.315 0.321 0.311 0.315 0.321
Notes: Unit of observation is at the individual-level. The dependent variables are binary
indicators for the decision to work, the decision to work away from home, and the decision
to work for one’s self. The treatment group includes married women, while the control
group includes widowed women. Individual control variables include age, years of
education, household size, owning a tv, owning a radio, and having access to electricity.
Results presented are odds ratios are produced by logistic regressions. Standard errors are
clustered at the year-region level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are
denoted by ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤⇤⇤. Reported R2 is pseudo R2. Source: Demographic Health Survey
(DHS) 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2008.
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Table 14: Dynamic Same-Sex Marriage Wage-Legalization Specifications -
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA)
Controlling for ENDA
Dependent V ariable : Log Wage
TSS  2 TSS  4 TSS  6
Lesbian·SSM ·Post 0.028 0.035 0.026
(0.064) (0.054) (0.042)
Controls
Demographic X X X
Occupation X X X
Region X X X
N 2, 765, 739 2, 811, 637 2, 896, 968
R
2 0.310 0.314 0.321
Notes: Unit of observation is at the individual-level. Weights in the estimation are
individual sample weights. Regressions include demographic, occupation, and region
controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and presented in parentheses.
Demographic controls include schooling, schooling squared, experience, experience squared,
dummy variables for having a high school degree, an A.A. degree, a B.A. degree, a M.A.
degree, a Ph.D. degree, being Black, being Hispanic, and achieving English proficiency.
Occupation controls are dummy variables for major occupation categories. Region controls
are dummy variables for the U.S. Census divisions and urban residents. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤⇤⇤. N is the number of
observations. Source: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
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Table 17: Same-Sex Relationship Wage-Recognition Decomposition Specifi-
cations Stratified by Partnership Status
Dependent V ariable : Log Wage
Stratification Primary Partner Secondary Partner
Civil Union Domestic Partnership Civil Union Domestic Partnership
Lesbian·Rec·Post 0.159 ⇤ ⇤⇤ 0.193 ⇤ ⇤⇤  0.011 0.105⇤
(0.95) (0.050) (0.110) (0.060)
Controls
Demographic X X X X
Occupation X X X X
Region X X X X
N 940, 607 940, 607 1, 972, 342 1, 972, 342
R2 0.315 0.312 0.311 0.311
Notes: Unit of observation is at the individual-level. Weights in the estimation are
individual sample weights. Regressions include demographic, occupation, and region
controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and presented in parentheses.
Demographic controls include schooling, schooling squared, experience, experience squared,
dummy variables for having a high school degree, an A.A. degree, a B.A. degree, a M.A.
degree, a Ph.D. degree, being Black, being Hispanic, and achieving English proficiency.
Occupation controls are dummy variables for major occupation categories. Region controls
are dummy variables for the U.S. Census divisions and urban residents. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤⇤⇤. N is the number of
observations. Source: 1990 U.S. Decennial Census and 2013 American Community Survey.
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